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Connected Europe(ans)?

The Quantitative Measurement of Horizontal Europeanisation.

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Abstract: Considering the current process of horizontal Europeanisation which has resulted from the new opportunity structure created by the EU, this article discusses to what extent the European Member States are economically and socially intertwined. The proposition of this paper is that social interactions go hand in hand with economical interactions between the European Member States. In order to validate this assumption, a horizontal Europeanisation index that measures Europeanisation in contrast to globalisation was developed. The underlying variables of our index cover 25 European countries and were mainly collected from OECD and EUROSTAT. Almost all European countries are economically more Europeanised than globalised. We observed a medium correlation between the economic and social dimension, indicating a rather low systematic pattern between the two dimensions of horizontal Europeanisation in 2011. However, this assumption cannot be upheld when considering the time perspective from 2007 to 2011. Over time, social cross-border transactions are relatively disconnected from economical cross-border transaction.

Keywords: Horizontal Europeanisation Index, European Integration, Interactions in Europe

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1 Introduction

Europe is the geographical entity with the highest amount of cross-border transactions and networking on the globe (Mau and Mewes, 2012). These interactions are facilitated by the *acquis communautaire*, which guarantees the non-discrimination of citizens and companies within other Member States and led to the stepwise implementation of a single market. In addition, at the present time 18 countries have simplified trade interactions by introducing a common currency.

Horizontal Europeanisation, or the analysis of social and economic interactions within the EU area, is a rather new focus of the Sociology of Europe. Among the various transnational interrelations which occur between people, institutions and organisations, it is especially cross-border practices (Díez-Medrano et al., 2013; Favell, 2008; Guiraudon, 2011), attitudes (Delhey et al., 2014; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013) and awareness of other European citizens (Delhey and Kohler, 2007; Heidenreich and Härpfer, 2010) that have been investigated within the last years. Qualitative studies on everyday practices such as travelling and purchasing in Europe have shown that Europe seems to be a relevant reference point for individual and economic interaction (Favell, 2008; Roose, 2012). In addition, a number of quantitative measures enabling the degree of the Europeanisation of nation-states to be described and compared have been already partly undertaken (Delhey et al., 2014; König and Ohr, 2013). In their *Europeanization Index of Everyday Life*, Delhey et al. (2014) captured the respective relevance of the national, European and global space for individual interactions such as travelling and shopping as well as cognitive dimensions of Europeanisation such as solidarity and interest in culture. In a similar vein, the study conducted by König and Ohr (2013) created an *EU-index* of economic practices within Europe, shedding light on the movements of goods, services, capital and labour across the EU. Both studies analyse the relative importance of European interactions in contrast to global interactions. Two geographic reference points are of importance when investigating horizontal Europeanisation empirically. Firstly the European closure towards the world, and secondly the national openness towards the EU (for further information on the relational approach see Delhey et al., 2014).

European closure is important for distinguishing social transformation processes within Europe from the process of globalisation on the European continent. The EU constitutes a particular political setting that wields a high degree of regulatory power, affecting the everyday

life of Europeans directly and indirectly.¹ National openness matters because the EU is nested within a global sphere. Delanty and Rumford (2005) believe that the social changes which Europe is undergoing cannot only be explained by EU institutional developments. They postulate that at least part of these social changes constitute transformations which have a global scope. Streeck (2013) analyses Europeanisation as a neoliberal project that makes the region a main site for global trends². Therefore, we comprehend Europeanisation as a process of closure within globalisation. Hence, when analysing Horizontal Europeanisation, we have to focus on the social processes occurring within European borders and see to what extent they constitute an area with a particular quality within global processes.

In this paper, we will refer to Deutsch's (1966) and Delhey's (2004) transactionalist approach in order to analyse the propensity for European interactions. We want to study the interrelations between European citizens, a process which can be summed up under the term Horizontal Europeanisation (Hanquinet and Savage, 2013; Kriesi et al., 2008; Kuhn, 2011). These social and economic interrelations reveal the mutual relevance (Deutsch, 1966, Delhey, 2004) of Europeans for each other. Analysing propensities for European interactions is thus our means of studying the "Europeanisation of national societies" (Bach, 2000), which describes the changing use of the opportunity structure by the EU citizens (who do not necessarily have to be aware of the European dimension of their action). We do not expect to find a social space full of border transcending practices when analysing Europe, but we assume a certain degree of interlinkages between individuals and companies, which could form a basis for social integration at a later point in time. The overall aim of our study is to assess the Europeanisation of the 25 EU Member States in different spheres of everyday life for the years 2007 to 2011. This analysis is motivated by the assumption that economic integration within the EU will be accompanied by higher degrees of personal and social interactions. Economic integration is often regarded as the basis for more personal freedoms and rights. These can be created through positive feedback effects and lead to cross-border practices of individuals.

¹ Unlike globalisation and internationalization, Europeanization constitutes a direct outcome of political decisions (Favell et al., 2011) and has often been framed as a specific response to worldwide developments (Bartolini, 2005).

² The fact that European nation-states belong to the most globalised countries has also been affirmed by the *KOF index for Globalisation* in the economic, social and political fields (Dreher, Gaston and Martens, 2008), as well as by the *DHL Global Connectedness Index* (GCI) in the areas of trade, capital, information and people (Ghemawat and Altman, 2012).

Two research questions drive this study: to what extent do countries with higher levels of economic integration also exhibit increased levels of social exchanges with other EU Member States? And to what extent have both social and economic European integration developed in similar directions over the past five years? The structure of the paper is as follows: The next section will describe horizontal Europeanisation in terms of social and economic interactions within Europe and propose our research questions. This will be followed by a brief description of the data and methods for the construction of the horizontal Europeanisation index (HE-index) and a presentation of the data. The final sections will set out our empirical findings and conclusions.

2 Studying horizontal Europeanisation

We adopt a broad understanding of Europeanisation as a process of transforming the social and political order of the nation-states by broadening not just institutional capacities but also transforming cultural dynamics within the European geographic space. European integration incorporates both the institutionalisation of vertical and horizontal linkages between actors. Vertical associations in particular denote relationships between the supranational level and the state and have been a focus point in political science as well as in EU legal studies³. Complementing this approach, horizontal Europeanisation refers to a variety of individual cross-border interactions between Member States, such as communication, mobility or networks (Mau and Mewes, 2012: 10). The EU institutions and rules with their vertical impact on the Member States are assumed to shape the opportunity structure for horizontal cross-border interactions and relations. Practices of European citizens, organisations and institutions which extend beyond the national context are the focus of horizontal Europeanisation (De Swann, 1995; Gerhards and Rössel, 1999; Mau and Mewes, 2012). Europeanisation can thus be conceptualised as a subdimension of transnationalisation, as it refers to the multiple cross-border linkages of individuals and organisations within Europe (Vertovec, 1999). These interrelations on which we will focus in the following analysis are constituted by individuals' transactions and cross-border practices of companies.

³ In this framework, "downstream effects" of EU legal and political directives, decisions and jurisdiction on specific national structures (Bartolini, 2005; Flockhart, 2010; Green Cowles, Carporaso and Risse, 2001) have been covered.

2.1 Economic cross-border interactions

The creation of a common market was the main objective of the European integration process, which had the overall purpose of securing peace within Europe. The European Commission aimed to create positive side-effects for the economies of the respective Member States as well as increased cohesion between the different regions of Europe (van Houtum, 1998). The implementation of the European internal market project and the European Monetary Union (EMU) led to higher incentives for European economic cooperation by reducing transaction costs and allowing for economies of scale. In particular, they minimised uncertainties related to the managing of multiple currencies through the elimination of exchange rate risks and by making prices more transparent and comparable (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007; König and Ohr, 2013). Additionally, the proximity of customers constitutes a convincing reason for companies to concentrate their interactions within Europe.

The economic integration of the Member States is quite advanced and practices of economic interaction have skyrocketed since the stepwise implementation of the common market. In addition, cross-border mergers and investment within the Euro area have become more common (Ilzkovitz et al., 2007). In their analysis of 15 EU countries between 1999 and 2010, König and Ohr (2003) furthermore show that European economic integration is still increasing in all EU countries, with the exception of Spain. Nevertheless, they reveal that the GIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain), which are most affected by the current recession, and countries which are not members of the European monetary union (Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom) report lower levels of economic integration throughout the investigated time period.

Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998) regard business organisations as constitutive pioneers of European integration. For them, European society is made up of non-governmental actors who are involved in European cross-border practices and thereby impact processes of policy-making and other outcomes at the European level. Accordingly, economic interactions will have a much higher effect on the Europeanisation of nation-states than individual interactions, as they exert influence on a broader range of people.

2.2 Social cross-border interactions

Everyday practices of individuals constitute the dominant level of analysis for horizontal Europeanisation research (Delhey, 2004; Delhey et al., 2014). The main pioneer supporting the analysis of social transnational interactions has been Karl Deutsch. In his transactionalist approach, he notes that the success of integration will depend on four background conditions: firstly mutual relevance of the united countries, secondly gains from integration for all entities, thirdly communication among elites, and lastly a certain amount of shared identity and loyalty. The mutual relevance can be deducted as the most important factor from the relative volume of transaction processes (Deutsch, 1966). In particular, he denotes common practices such as trade, travel, post and other kinds of communication as important processes which take place between the people of a country and pave the way for social integration (Deutsch, 1966, 1972). Accordingly, the main way in which Europeanisation of nation-states can be accomplished is through a variety of cross-border economic and socio-cultural interactions among European citizens. When analysing European social processes, we have to be aware, however, of the fact that the Central Eastern European countries (CEEC) faced legal restrictions on the free movement of workers, imposed by most of the old Member States. While these restrictions expired within the analysed period for the Member States that joined in 2004, it still persisted for Romania and Bulgaria, which are furthermore disadvantaged by being excluded from the Schengen Agreement.

With respect to European practices, inter-European travelling, working and studying are perceived by the majority of Europeans as direct benefits of EU membership (Favell and Recchi 2011). By analysing Eurobarometer data, Delhey et al. (2014) show that travelling seems to constitute by far the most Europeanised activity. It is also the only cross-national activity which has a particular focus on Europe. Other activities like shopping or family relations have typically a national or local focus. Furthermore, only 10 percent of all Europeans have had immigration experiences in the past and these experiences are usually not concentrated in Europe. Immigration is as likely to happen within the EU as elsewhere in the world (Delhey et al., 2014). Nonetheless, Favell (2008) shows that for European professionals a new denationalised Europe is emerging. This implies that nation-states no longer constitute the only relevant job market. Furthermore, people aspire to gain cultural experience abroad because this conveys a certain kind of “signalling” to future employers (Spence, 1981; Teichler and

Jahr, 2001). Favell and Recchi (2011) highlighted that mobile Europeans are not just constituted by the stereotypical Eurostars from the upper class. Members of the middle- and lower-middle class are becoming much more mobile, particularly if they possess high educational and linguistic capabilities. Regarding the everyday interactions of European citizens, the use of associations, sports clubs, shopping opportunities and petrol stations within other European countries have formed a focus point (Müller, 2014; Roose, 2010, 2013). Here, particular attention has been paid to the border regions, where the decision to engage in social activities outside the confines of the nation-state is not inhibited by simple geographical distance⁴.

Nonetheless, despite the increasing exchange of goods, capital and people, the nation-state territory still determines social interaction for the majority of Europeans. In particular, this has been proven for romantic partnerships. While the share of intermarriages between European partners increased within the last decades, this still concerns only a small group of persons (Díez-Medrano et al., 2013). In sum, European interactions already seem to be *directly* or *indirectly* mundane in the life of ordinary European citizens (Díez Medrano, 2008; Kuhn, 2011; Mau and Büttner, 2010).

2.3 Relationship between economic and social cross-border interactions

The single European market began with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, a long time before the rights of EU citizens became strengthened. Economic Europeanisation is thus relatively high (König and Ohr, 2013) whereas Europeanisation on the personal dimension is rather low, as only particular groups of society are affected by cross-border interactions (Mau and Verwiebe, 2010). Given that the social and economic aspects cannot be separated, the economic liberalisation that occurred also increased personal freedoms, for instance travelling or working in other European countries. One assumption which has been predominant in EU studies is that for this reason economic integration is accompanied by social integration: “Most accounts of European integration presuppose di-

⁴ For further information on attitudes towards Europe see Gerhards and Lengfeld (2013), Fligstein (2008), Kuhn (2011) and Recchi and Nebe (2003). Regarding the identification with Europe see Díez Medrano (2008).

rectly or indirectly a particular understanding of integration as system integration and assume that this translates into cultural cohesion” (Delanty and Rumford, 2005).

This idea can be found in much of the key literature on the EU. One of the founding fathers of EU studies, Haas, assumed positive feedback loops which would be initiated by the transfer of a certain amount of authority to the Commission. Positive outcomes of economic integration would lead to further integration on the political level (spill-over) but also to “shifting loyalties” (Haas, 1968). He assumed three kinds of socialisation processes (Risse, 2005) by which persons became more aware of the European community: firstly, when they see benefits from the supranational project, secondly, by being pressured into conformity and thirdly, for instrumental reasons (Haas, 1968). Haas especially focused on policy-makers and social and economic elites, but there is no reason why this process of internalisation should not account for the population as a whole, in the sense that they actively perceive the opportunity structure offered by the EU. In the debate on European identification, the idea that personal economic benefits from the Europeanisation process increase the European outlook and identity is also very strong (Roose, 2013). This can be seen in particular with reference to the upper social strata, whose economic and cultural capital enables them to maintain strong interactions with people from other European countries (Fligstein, 2008). While referring to Haas, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz (1997) come to the same conclusion: given that actors in the economic sphere (re-)produce and shape the rules and structures of social interactions, they will also be the ones to provide the basis for European social interaction.

Delanty and Rumford (2005) and also Gerhards and Lengfeld (2013) reflect this idea by differentiating between system and social integration.⁵ While there is a controversy about these two concepts and the areas to which they can apply, we follow Delanty and Rumford’s and Gerhards and Lengfeld’s application of the terms to the EU in their respective books. For Delanty and Rumford, system integration refers to the integration of societies achieved primarily by the state and markets, while social integration constitutes integration achieved through public discourse and a convergence of the social structure. They see the system integration of Europe reflected in the *acquis communautaire* with its expansion of the rule of

⁵ These terms were coined by Lockwood (1961) and used and developed by Habermas (1987). For Lockwood, the term “social integration” referred to social interactions among actors, while system integration covers the relationship among institutionalised parts. Habermas specified that social integration is therefore driven more by communication and norms, while system integration displays instrumental rationalities (Delanty and Rumford, 2005)

EU law. Gerhards and Lengfeld (2013) try to capture the social integration of European nation-states by analysing the mutual recognition of political and social rights of EU citizens in thought as well as in their everyday practices. In both contributions to the study of Europeanisation, the authors agree with the idea first formulated by Deutsch (1966) that “integration” can only be considered as accomplished when the system integration is followed and complemented by the integration of the people. (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2013). Moreover, all of the abovementioned authors have the notion of the “process” of Europeanisation as the core of their argument. This means that European interconnectedness among people implies a time perspective.

The question therefore is whether a high economic integration is accompanied by high personal European interactions a country. Hence, the first hypothesis we want to test focuses on the relationship between economic and personal horizontal Europeanisation in a cross-sectional perspective:

H1: The higher the degree of national economic cross-border interactions within Europe, the higher the propensity of personal cross-border interactions within Europe.

In order to consider the *processuality* of the Europeanisation *process*, the development of both dimensions of integration will be investigated in the second step of our analysis. Here, we aim to discover in more detail a systematic relationship between the development of economic and personal Europeanisation. If our results show an aligned development of both dimensions, this would support the assumption that rising economic interactions give rise to positive feedback effects and therefore lead to more interactions on the personal dimension (Haas, 1968; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). Hence, our second hypothesis which applies a time-series perspective is:

H2: Rising economic interactions are accompanied by rising personal interactions and increase the horizontal Europeanisation of countries.

3 Data and Methods

Our key variables measuring the degree of horizontal Europeanisation were collected from OECD, EUROSTAT and other worldwide, European and national data sources (see appendix).

We were able to cover 25 EU Member States in our analyses for the years 2007 and 2011.⁶ We collected variables according to the following theoretical background.

Considering the understanding that “integration” is not complete until system integration is followed and accompanied by social integration (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2013), our index distinguishes between two fields of integration. On the one hand, we follow Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1998), who see economic actors as the dominant players for Europeanisation. Therefore, the first field of integration in our index is the “*Economy Dimension*”. This subsumes five types of exchanges, referring to the European Union’s freedoms of goods and capital as well as knowledge transfer. The degree of goods transactions is reflected in our index through the amount of *exports* and *imports*. Financial interactions of capital are included through *FDI flows*. Foreign direct investments are not always linked to the real economy, but in most cases they represent shares in European companies, acquisition of capital and thus the provision of employment opportunities. The knowledge dimension includes *R&D co-operations* and *co-patents*, illustrating the connection between European companies.

On the other hand, we will follow Deutsch (1966, 1972) and focus on the interactions and transactions of individuals. Derived from this, our second field of integration is the “*Social Dimension*” which comprises the social practices of European citizens. Some of the interactions occur on a more regular basis (e.g. communication or tourism) while others are one-time decisions (e.g. the decision to immigrate or study abroad). Four types of social horizontal Europeanisation are included in our index. Mobility refers to persons living abroad for a longer time, for example *immigrants* or *foreign workers*. Exchange mobility or migration indicates an especially high degree of Europeanisation and constitutes the most important freedom of the EU for many individuals (Delhey, 2004; Díez Medrano, 2008). Additionally, educational exchanges such as *Erasmus* offer a good opportunity to establish ties with other European countries. Likewise *tourism* is a more regular European interaction, which has been facilitated by the Schengen Agreement.

⁶ The 25 countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovakia and the United Kingdom. In order to eliminate missing values at certain points in time, for each country and variable we used the mean value for the years 2006 and 2007, 2008 and 2009 as well as 2010 and 2011. Hence, values for the year 2011 refer indeed to the average value of the jointed years 2010 and 2011.

When choosing variables that describe the Europeanisation of the nation-state, we included both outgoing and incoming transactions, since both kinds of transactions can establish cross-border networks, flows of information and co-operations. Table 1 summarises the dimensions, variables and the operationalisation of the HE index.

<i>Dimension</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Operationalisation</i>
<i>Economy</i>	- Goods	- EU Exports - EU imports
	- Capital	- FDI flows (outward)
	- Knowledge	- R&D co-operations - Co-patents
<i>Social</i>	- Mobility	- Foreign workers - Immigration
	- Tourism	- Outbound tourism
	- Education	- Foreign students

Table 1: *The theoretical construction of the HE index*

Source: Author's own table.

Note: All variables show the ratio of transactions towards EU countries and towards non-EU countries (for EC) as well as the ratio of transactions towards the EU countries and the national counterpart (for NO).

Deutsch (1966, 1972) argued that “integration is dependent on the density and intensity of the exchange of information, capital, goods and people” (Mau and Mewes, 2012: 11). We therefore focus on relative values rather than on absolute values and furthermore distinguish between two different perspectives by calculating two ratios. First, the ratio of EU- and worldwide volumes systematically indicates the extent to which transnational economic and social relations are located within Europe (EC). However, this tells us little about the absolute relevance of these interactions. However, as this is necessary to understand the importance of the chosen economic and social variables for each country, we devised an additional relation of European values with national values (NO) (Delhey et al., 2014).

By using a Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA), we choose the variables which are of highest importance to form our two latent constructs, *social* and *economy*⁷. A CFA is a structuring equation model that is used to test a hypothesis about latent factors. With it we can find out to what extent the different variables listed in Table 1 vary from each other and are able to be agglomerated into a common latent factor. The two constructs, economy and social, are

⁷ In the CFA, we included further variables (e.g. transport of freight and persons, exports and imports of print media, tourism overnight stays as well as multiple other economic and social practices). These were not described above because they did not contribute to a better identification of our latent factors.

tested for both EC and NO ratios. However, the factor loadings for the same variables do differ to some degree between the two indices, which means that the different variables will play a varying role within the identification as the factor loadings will be used as our weights. The social dimension of both ratios is highly shaped by the immigration variable (0.86 for EC; 0.96 for NO). The combination of the described variables in both indices is highly significant, showing a CFI⁸ of 0.98 in both indices and an alpha⁹ of 0.9 in the NO ratio and 0.8 in the EC index.

Regarding the economic dimension, both of the constructs EC and NO are highly significant (CFI of 0.97 and alpha of 0.63 for EC and CFI of 0.99 and alpha of 0.8 for NO). For the EC-ratio the exports variable has the highest importance (0.77) followed by co-patents (0.67), while for the NO-ratio the imports represent the strongest predictive power (0.96), followed by the exports (0.76) (see Annex 5). These factor loadings will be subsequently used as weights which are specific for every variable but assumed to be constant over time and countries. In order to gain a zero to one scale¹⁰, all factor loadings are rescaled. The same procedure was repeated for the single ratios in the EC and NO as described above and for specific outliers a cut-off point was set. As the last step, the final EC- and NO-index were calculated as the weighted sum of all EC- and NO factors as:

$$EC_{i,t} = \sum_{x=1}^n \lambda_x \frac{Vol_{EU}(x_{i,t})}{Vol_{WORLD}(x_{i,t})} \quad (1.1)$$

$$NO_{i,t} = \sum_{x=1}^n \lambda_x \frac{Vol_{EU}(x_{i,t})}{Vol_{NAT}(x_{i,t})} \quad (1.2)$$

In the equation, x defines the variables (e.g. number of tourists travelling), i the country and t the point in time. *EU*, *World* and *Nat* refer to the geographical locus of the transaction process. The EC and the NO index are country-specific time-series variables. We take the sum of

⁸ The comparative Fit Index (CFI) measures the model fit in structural equation models. It equals the discrepancy function adjusted for sample size. CFI ranges from 0 to 1, whereby a value of 0.90 or greater implies an acceptable model fit (Hu and Bentler, 1999).

⁹ The indicator Cronbach's alpha measures internal consistency showing the dense of a set of item's interrelatedness. It ranges from minus infinitely to one; the reliability coefficient is rated as good above a value of 0.6.

¹⁰ Where 0 indicates no horizontal Europeanisation (0%) and 1 an ideal "complete" horizontal Europeanisation (100%).

all weighted quotients (by the factor λ_x) of the volumes of two differently located transactions (EU/world and EU/national). In the final step, a robustness check was conducted to ensure that our relational approach towards Europeanisation adds an additional value to pure volume oriented cross-border research. The single factors, in other words the exchange volumes of the different dimensions, are not correlated with the EC and NO indices on the 0.01 significance level. This is the case for all the indicators of the EC and NO economy dimension. With one exception, this is also the case for the social dimension, only the values for student exchanges are correlated (0.56). The consequential finding is that there is an additional value from our approach to index construction using the relative value, since at the same time we show that the individual factors are correlated among each other (see appendix).

Before presenting our results, we want to underline four limitations of our study. Firstly, we observe a rather short period of time, which runs the risk of misinterpretation due to the economic, political and social changes in Europe within the last years. Secondly, our macro data was extracted from different databases (OECD, Eurostat, national statistical bureaus etc.), which may have led to minor inconsistencies in the construction of the index. In particular, we had to find a way of dealing with the definition of Europe (geographic or political). Nevertheless, we guarantee a coherent definition across all countries and years for each single variable. Thirdly and lastly, due to data restrictions we could not include important social transactions, such as cross-border online-purchases, transnational e-mail contacts or telephone calls and similar regular cross-border activities. This may have led to biased analyses of social Europeanisation.

4 Results

We will first of all describe the degree of the HE-index across European countries. Next, we calculate the correlation of the social interactions and economic interactions. Thirdly, we will analyse the interaction between these two dimensions. Due to reasons of parsimony, our empirical results focus on discussing the European closure aspect of our index. Nevertheless, our results are transferable to the national openness indicators, since both indicators are

highly correlated¹¹. The results presented in the following correspond to the year 2011 if not otherwise indicated.

4.1 Describing economic and social Europeanisation

At least half of the economic cross-border transactions of European countries take place within the EU, with the exception being the UK (see Figure 1). This result indicates a higher degree of European economic interactions compared to worldwide economic interactions. In other words, almost all European countries are economically more connected to Europe than non-European countries.




Figure 1: Economic and social European closure 2011
Source: Author’s own calculations.
Notes: Average weighted values of economic and social European closure (EC-2011)

¹¹ The values of the EC and NO-index are correlated with each other to a highly significant degree, persons to 0.8 and economy to 0.96. While the values of the NO-index add to the EC-index in showing us the relevance of the particular variables within each country, our index of European closure informs us about the usage of the European social and economic opportunity structure, already on its own.

Luxembourg, Slovakia, Portugal, the Czech Republic and Poland show the highest integration on the economic dimension with over 75 percent. One reason for this can be found in the economic history of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). After the fall of the Iron Curtain, most of these countries experienced a de-industrialisation with a drop in national industrial output by 30 to 70 percent in the early 1990s. In the following years, the rather weak industries of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia became important as supplying industries (the “work-benches”) for Western Europe. Consequently, most of the exports of these countries continue to stay within Europe (Hofbauer, 2004). On the other hand, Luxembourg’s high rate can be explained by its small size and limited opportunities within the internal market (Eisenstadt, 1985). The economies of central and northern Europe have strong positions in worldwide trade and thus show average degrees of European economic closure. The lowest degree of economically Europeanisation is measured for the UK. We assume that this can be explained by its economic and cultural proximity to the U.S. and the Commonwealth. Only around 50 percent of imports and exports come from or go to other European countries. Furthermore, the financial market place in London with its great importance for global capital transactions may play a crucial role in the UK’s low level of economic European integration. Similarly, Greece’s low level of economic Europeanisation can be attributed to its cultural and linguistic proximity to non-EU Member States, in this case eastwards, and its peripheral geographic location.

Contrary to the relatively high level of integration in the economic sphere, the social sphere shows a much lower degree of Europeanisation. The EU is the reference point in less than every second international transaction. Countries with a smaller size or numerous bordering EU nation-states (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland) are more likely to have cross-border interactions. These results are in line with the theoretical assumptions (Gerhards, 2010). The high social Europeanisation in Luxembourg and Belgium is furthermore augmented by their central role for the EU institutions and lobby groups. In these two countries, the share of employees from other European countries compared to non-European countries is over 75 percent. Ireland is rather an outlier in this group because of its peripheral geographic location. However, this effect seems to be outweighed by its strong bond with the EU. This was established via the European Structural Fund, which played a central role in its rise from an economic laggard to the “Celtic Tiger of Europe”. A high degree of social Europeanisation can also be observed for Slovakia and the Czech Republic,

although this result could be attributed to strong bilateral relationships between the two former unified countries. Interestingly, all Mediterranean Member States show the same degree of social Europeanisation. Around 40 percent of all social interactions in Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece occur in Europe compared to the global level. For certain countries (with the exception of Greece), this rather low level of integration can be explained through their colonial past, which brings about strong cultural ties to other parts of the world and explains the high number of immigrants as well as foreign workers from non-European countries. The UK shows a similar degree of social interactions, which strengthens this assumption. Furthermore, it seems to be a common tendency that the CEEC which do not (or only since shortly) enjoy all the rights given through EU-membership feature the lowest degrees of cross-border European practices on the social level. Hence, this appears to be a manifestation of the impact of the duration of EU membership on the degree of Europeanisation.

Two insights can thus be gained so far. Firstly, countries have much higher Europeanisation values in the economic dimension than in the social dimension. This highlights the importance of economic interactions for the process of Europeanisation. The social level, which represents the European social practices of the people, is much lower. Secondly, there is a great difference in the degree of Europeanisation between new, economically weak Member States and older Member States with a relatively strong national economy.

We now return to our first hypothesis (H1), which stated that a higher degree of economic Europeanisation is accompanied by a higher degree of social integration. The correlation analysis reveals a medium relationship with Pearson's $r = 0.36$, which is significant at the 0.1 level. The NO-Index (see Annex 1) shows a similar relation of both dimensions, whereby the social dimension is rather low because of the low proportion of social cross-border interactions¹². This supports the theoretical assumption that there is a certain systematic pattern between these two dimensions. However, we cannot conclude that social European interactions are higher in countries with strong economic bonds with other EU Member States, as the correlation investigates only one year. In order to draw inferences about the relationship

¹² This indicates that intra-European social interactions are relatively low when compared to their national reference categories. The share of European free-movers who work or study abroad is relatively small in contrast to the absolute number of persons working or studying in a country. This can be in particular attributed to the fact that in the CEEC few people have the economic and linguistic abilities to live abroad for a longer period of time (Mau and Mewes, 2012).

of both kinds of horizontal Europeanisation, in the next section we consider the processuality of the two dimensions from 2007 to 2011.

4.2 Development of Europeanisation: Positive feedback loops?

We hypothesised that economic integration is associated with social integration (H2). We asked if and to what extent the development in both dimensions is systematically interdependent. However, although the chosen time-span of 2007 to 2011 is the most recent available, it involves the issue of covering the worst crisis of the EU. If we look at the changes in the social and economic dimension of the EC Index, no clear conclusion concerning the development of Europeanisation processes can be drawn. In general, the countries can be separated into four groups, showing either positive or negative tendencies in the economic and social sphere. Figure 2 summarises the country clusters, while figure 3 shows the interdependence of both dimensions in more detail.

		social interaction	
		increase	decrease
economic interaction	increase	BG, CY, CZ, LT, PL, PT, SI	IE, (LU), (NL), (SE)
	decrease	AT, DK, UK, HU, SK, (FI), (FR)	ES, GR, IT, LV, EE, (BE), (DE)

Figure 2: Changes in the economic and social dimension (2007-2011)
Source: Author's own table.
Note: Countries in brackets show only minor changes in the observed time period. (Author's own table.)




Figure 3: *Development of economic and social horizontal Europeanisation between 2007 and 2011*
Source: Author's own calculation
Note: All arrows show the change in the ratio of transactions towards EU countries and towards non-EU countries (EC).

The first group encompassing Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia shows a unanimous rise in connectedness in both dimensions. An increasing economic interaction rate, which is accompanied by an increasing social interaction rate, is an indicator for an augmented degree of Europeanisation. In this group the highest increases in European social interactions can be observed. This supports our second hypothesis (H2) and is in line with the scholars who expect economic integration to form the basis for social integration. Remarkably, this group consists of predominantly Central Eastern European countries, most of which have large territories and were not affected by the economic crisis.

The exception is Portugal, whose high advance in European social interactions separates it from the group of crisis countries (GR, IT, ES, LV and EE), which are characterised by negative developments in both dimensions¹³. The decline in European economic integration can be explained by the fact that the reduction of economic interactions was higher within the EU than worldwide. It is apparent that the economic interactions seem to fluctuate to a higher degree than social dynamics. Exogenous shocks such as the Eurozone crisis are affecting social European interactions only to a certain extent. It seems plausible that in countries struggling with the Eurozone crisis, peoples' monetary resources and therefore their means and opportunities for travelling abroad will suffer. Moreover, countries in economic recession do not provide an attractive labour market for foreign workers and immigrants. This effect can be particularly observed in countries where the medium income is already rather low, e.g. Latvia with its remarkable drop in social interactions by nearly 7 percentage points. From this we can conclude that sharp economic drops do not seem to be associated with a reduction in social interactions to the same extent. Once established, the social Europeanisation of a country does not vary to high degrees; here, social path dependencies may be at work. Given that a certain amount of structures which support social interactions are established, e.g. student exchanges, they will be utilised by individuals even under restrictive economic conditions. Similar to the former groups, the development of social integration also seems to be path dependent in countries in which we observe a certain economic growth but a negative development in the social sphere. The reductions in social interactions are so minimal for the already very highly integrated Old Member States of Ireland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands and Sweden that they are hardly worth mentioning. While in the fourth group the social interconnectedness is growing to varying degrees, the economic dimensions are declining. The high number of centrally located countries (Austria, Denmark, Slovakia and Hungary and the UK) within this group seems to contradict our second hypothesis (H2). This does not need to be the case, however, if we assume path dependencies on the social level as described above.

In sum, a consistent pattern of interdependence between economic and social Europeanisation cannot be observed, however we can still draw certain insights from the development. Only seven out of 25 countries, all of which are new Member States, show the expected rela-

¹³ In this context, it also has to be acknowledged that migration effects will not show up in the country of origin but in the country in which these people immigrate, work and contribute to the social life.

tion between economic and social Europeanisation. All three Member States with the highest increase in social integration from 2007 to 2011 are new Member States (Cyprus, the Czech Republic and Hungary), whose European social integration increased by ten percent points during these four years. We can conclude that Europeanisation on the social level is not uniquely a result of economic Europeanisation. Nevertheless, the use of the opportunity structure for social interactions is to a certain extent related to a country's level of economic interactions and to the process of economic integration. Other determining factors for the degree of integration such as country size and location as well as general political and economic trends are equally pivotal to the development of social integration (Mau and Mewes 2012). In particular economic capital seems to play a certain role, although its effect is becoming less pronounced in Member States which already have a certain social infrastructure with a European outlook. Social path dependencies can be identified and the trend analysis very clearly shows the extent to which European social integration is a process that takes time and is not subject to high fluctuations. From this we can conclude that our second hypothesis (H2) is only valid for some CEEC countries. The economic crisis is to be regarded as an exogenous shock and it seems to have affected the opportunities of the Mediterranean countries in particular. For the other countries, however, we cannot yet speak of a decoupling of economic and social integration as the time span under scrutiny is too short. Nevertheless, the question arises whether a saturation point for Europeanisation of the social lifeworld exists. Given the stability or marginal decline of the social Europeanisation rates for the most integrated Western European countries, namely Luxembourg, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium, one might assume a reversed development (U-turn) for those forerunners. For persons with high degrees of economic and linguistic capital, Europe might become less attractive, since European interactions are valued less as distinction criteria for the elite. Worldwide interconnections are aspired too. This assumption is supported by the KOF Globalisation index, which indicates the highest degrees of globalisation for precisely these countries.

5 Conclusion

The focus of our study was the horizontal Europeanisation of national societies. We expected that EU legal and political directives would impact on the current economic and social integration across nation-state borders. By shedding light on the level of horizontal Europeanisation across EU Member States, we explored the relationship between economic

and social interconnectedness. We compiled macro data for 25 EU countries for the years 2007 and 2011 to test the assumption that social interconnectedness among EU nation-states is connected to economic interconnectedness through positive feedback effects.

Three insights that contribute to the understanding of European integration processes have been provided by our cross-sectional and time-series analysis. Firstly, there is a high variation in the degree of horizontal Europeanisation in the economical and in the social dimension across the EU Member States. The economic Europeanisation is more advanced than the social Europeanisation, which can be explained by the high incentives given by the EU for European goods and capital trade, whereas only a minority of persons are affected by the enriched opportunities for travelling, working or studying abroad (the “Eurostars”). Secondly, we only found a correlation coefficient of $r=0.36$, which indicates that overall a high level of European economic interaction seems to be accompanied by a relatively high level of social interaction. However, this rather weak relationship does not necessarily indicate their co-variation, as only one point in time is investigated (2011). When examining their development between the year 2007 and 2011, we thirdly found no positive feedback loops from economic to social integration. This stands in sharp contrast to the expectations formulated on the basis of major contributions to the debate (Haas, 1968; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997). In only seven out of 25 countries was an increase in both dimensions observed. These seven countries, comprising Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia, all show a rise in both dimensions. In contrast, there are some countries where such developments cannot be observed within our investigated time period. This could partly be explained by the current financial and debt crisis in Europe, which constitutes an exogenous shock for Spain, Greece and Italy, but also Latvia and Estonia.

We conclude that economic Europeanisation is not the dominant driving force of social Europeanisation, contrary to the often-assumed interplay of the two. This means that both dimensions are relatively disconnected from another. Other determining factors for the level of social integration, for example the median income or foreign language skills in a given country, could be similarly pivotal to the further development of social European interconnectedness. We therefore come to the conclusion that individual transnational practices cannot be portrayed as an afterthought to economic integration. Like any social practice,

they are dependent on processes of contention and imitation which follow their own idiosyncratic logic. This finding needs to be investigated in more detail.

Annex


Annex 1: Values of the EC Index, social dimension (2007 and 2011)

EC - Social 2011			EC - Social 2007		
Rank	Country	Index Points	Rank	Country	Index Points
1	LU	84,82	1	LU	86,74
2	SK	67,88	2	IE	66,97
3	IE	66,74	3	BE	66,88
4	BE	66,02	4	SK	65,45
5	AT	63,92	5	NL	62,08
6	CY	60,13	6	AT	58,35
7	NL	59,58	7	DE	55,20
8	CZ	58,54	8	DK	52,97
9	HU	58,51	9	CY	50,71
10	DK	56,15	10	HU	49,35
11	DE	52,61	11	SE	49,18
12	FI	47,30	12	CZ	49,05
13	SE	46,86	13	FI	45,76
14	UK	44,43	14	UK	43,58
15	GR	41,02	15	GR	42,38
16	PT	40,39	16	IT	40,86
17	IT	40,05	17	ES	38,62
18	ES	38,49	18	LV	37,91
19	FR	38,18	19	FR	36,25
20	PL	34,54	20	EE	35,80
21	EE	34,28	21	PT	34,12
22	LT	31,70	22	LT	27,95
23	LV	31,16	23	PL	27,61
24	BG	26,20	24	BG	24,79
25	SI	16,77	25	SI	13,09

Annex 2: Values of the EC Index, economy dimension (2007 and 2011)

EC - Economy 2011			EC - Economy 2007		
Rank	Country	Index Points	Rank	Country	Index Points
1	LU	82,09	1	SK	84,73
2	SK	82,05	2	LU	80,01
3	PT	81,02	3	EE	78,88
4	CZ	79,39	4	CZ	78,79
5	PL	77,67	5	PT	77,05
6	EE	74,09	6	AT	75,13
7	AT	73,98	7	BE	73,93
8	BE	73,56	8	PL	73,15
9	LV	71,18	9	HU	72,61
10	HU	69,86	10	LV	72,18
11	ES	67,14	11	ES	71,84
12	LT	67,07	12	FI	66,70
13	CY	66,85	13	DK	66,47
14	NL	66,42	14	NL	66,37
15	FI	66,26	15	IT	65,94
16	DK	64,22	16	FR	64,91
17	SE	64,07	17	LT	63,28
18	SI	63,98	18	SE	62,97
19	FR	63,15	19	DE	62,51
20	IE	62,16	20	SI	61,16
21	IT	62,00	21	GR	59,43
22	DE	60,73	22	CY	58,77
23	BG	60,06	23	BG	57,46
24	GR	55,53	24	UK	53,82
25	UK	49,60	25	IE	50,76

Annex 3: Scatterplot of NO Index 2011 (social and economy dimension)



Source: Author's own calculations.

Notes: Average weighted values of economic and social national openness (NO-2011)

Annex 4: Factor loadings of the CFA analysis for both EC and NO indices.

<i>Dimensions</i>	<i>Factor loadings</i>	
	<i>EC - index</i>	<i>NO - index</i>
<i>Social dimension</i>		
<i>Outbound tourism</i>	0,728	0,644
<i>Working abroad</i>	0,645	0,805
<i>Immigration</i>	0,863	0,963
<i>Exchange students</i>	0,578	0,927
<i>Economy dimension</i>		
<i>Co-patents</i>	0,658	0,424
<i>R&D co-operations</i>	0,290	0,553
<i>Exports</i>	0,772	0,755
<i>Imports</i>	0,537	0,956
<i>FDI outflows</i>	0,454	0,642

Annex 5: Rank correlation between each volume included in the EC social dimension

	EC social	Exchange students	Working abroad	Immigration	Outbound tourism
EC-Social	1	0,472	0,227	0,226	0,244
Exchange students	0,472	1	0,861*	0,899*	0,836*
Working abroad	0,227	0,861*	1	0,954*	0,837*
Immigration	0,226	0,899*	0,954*	1	0,913*
Outbound tourism	0,243	0,836*	0,837*	0,913*	1

*P ≤ .01 is considered statistically significant

Annex 6: Rank-Correlation between each volume included in the EC-Economy-Index

	EC economy	FDI out-flows	R&D co-operations	Co-patents	Exports	Imports
EC-Economy	1	-0,116	-0,097	-0,288	-0,190	-0,212
FDI outflows	-0,116	1	0,532*	0,843*	0,747*	0,740*
R&D co-operations	-0,097	0,532*	1	0,695*	0,752*	0,732*
Co-patents	-0,288	0,843*	0,695*	1	0,912*	0,918*
Exports	-0,190	0,747*	0,752*	0,912*	1	0,975*
Imports	-0,212	0,740*	0,732*	0,918*	0,975*	1

*P ≤ .01 is considered statistically significant

Annex 7: Correlation between the two indices of each dimension (2011)

	EC-Social	NO-Social
EC-Social	1	0,798*
NO-Social	0,78*	1

	EC-Economy	NO-Economy
EC-Economy	1	0,964*
NO-Economy	0,8*	1

*P ≤ .01 is considered statistically significant

Annex 8: Correlation between the two dimensions of each index (2011)

	EC-Economy	EC-Social
EC-Economy	1	0,293
EC-Social	0,36*	1

	NO-Economy	NO-Social
NO-Economy	1	-0,002
NO-Social	-0,03	1

*P ≤ .01 is considered statistically significant

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